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INTRODUCTION
In his treatise, Federal Jurisdiction, Erwin Chemerinsky advocates pro-
tection for citizens through litigation on their behalf by sovereign entities
under parens patriae' standing.' "[I]n a society in which litigation costs are
enormous and the protection of constitutional rights is imperative, al-
lowing the government to sue on behalf of its citizens can provide
essential safeguards that otherwise might be lacking.",3 This is especially
true for Native Americans, as Lawrence Baca, President of the American
Indian Bar Association, notes with regard to racial discrimination:
Where racial issues and civil rights are concerned, the na-
tional conscience has largely passed over American Indians.
Indians are trapped in a national consciousness that perceives
[them] as historical relics and western movie backdrops. In-
dian people often perceive that the very institutions of
government that were established to fight race based dis-
crinmination have failed to include American Indians among
the protected classes.4
The economic situation in which most Native American people live only
reinforces the problematic nature of strictly individual assertions of rights!
1. Parens patriae is often defined as:
literally parent of the country, refers traditionally to role of state as sover-
eign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles or
the insane, and in child custody determinations, when acting on behalf of
the state to protect the interests of the child. It is the principle that the
state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such as mi-
nors who lack proper care and custody from their parents. It is a concept
of standing utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign interests such as
health, comfort and welfare of the people, interstate water rights, general
economy of the state, etc.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (internal quotes and citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has held that the State must be acting as an advocate for the
injured party. See Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 219 (1990).
2. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3, at 114 (3d ed. 1999)
(arguing for expanded parens patriae standing for governments).
3. Id. (specifically arguing for federal parens patriae standing).
4. Lawrence Baca, One Color Short of a Rainbow, 44 FED. LAW. 12, 15 (1997).
5. For example:
The 1990 census reports that 31 percent of all Indians live below the
poverty level. That figure is up from 1980, when 24 percent of all Indi-
ans, and 29 percent of reservation Indians, were living below poverty
level. Per capita income for Native Americans was slightly more than
$8,300, the lowest of all racial groups in the U.S., and less than half the
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Within the federal system, three types of sovereigns exist: Federal,
State, and Native American Tribal governments. The Federal govern-
ment has restricted the legal definition of Native American to members of
federally recognized Tribes.6 Native American tribal sovereignty is often
split into two categories: internal and external.7 Internal sovereignty in-
cludes the expansion of tribal law governing institutions, as well as
economic and social infrastructure." Native American Tribes also fight
external incursions on their sovereignty from both State and Federal
Governments.9 More recently, indigenous peoples from around the globe
have joined forces to create international protections for their people and
institutions. Native American Tribes struggle to retain their sovereign
internal and external rights in order to protect their members."
The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, as well as several Federal
District Courts, have accepted Tribes litigating under the doctrine of par-
ens patriae, although without analysis. 12 When Courts have dealt with the
level for the entire population. As of 1991, the Indian unemployment
rate was 45 percent. That was a 3 percent decrease since 1989, but still
37 percent higher than the average unemployment rate for the United
States as a whole.
DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 15 (4th ed. 1998).
6. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); 25 C.F.R. § 83.1 (1999) ("Indian
Tribe ... means any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, pueblo, village, or community
within the continental United States that the Secretary of the Interior presently acknowl-
edges to exist as an Indian tribe.").
Although this is the definition used in Federal Indian Law, Native communities
are far more accepting than the Federal Government of those not enrolled in a federally
recognized Tribe as Native American. For a variety of reasons, many individuals have
fallen through the cracks of enrollment procedures; thus Native American identity in
Native communities is functionally defined by association with a community, in addition
to self-identification, as well as by membership. See generally M. Annettee Jaimes, Some
Kind of Indian: On Race, Eugenics, and Mixed-Bloods, in AMERICAN MIXED RACE 133-153
(Naomi Zack ed., 1995) (arguing for a reconception of Indian identity based on tradi-
tional indigenous methods).
7. See Robert Clinton, Panel at the University of Michigan Native American Law
Students Association's American Indian Law Day (Mar. 26, 1999).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1996).
11. The concept of seven generations is common among Native Americans. An indi-
vidual's actions affect the next seven generations as well as the past seven generations. The
individual has the responsibility to act accordingly. Generally, Tribal governments focus
their projects on providing services or protection for their members.
12. See Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351 (9th Cir.
1996) (litigating on behalf of tribal members); In re Blue Lake Forest Products, Inc., 30
F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 1994); Navajo Nation v. Dist. Court for Utah County, Fourth
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question of tribal parens patriae standing, they have held that in certain
circumstances Tribes have parens patriae standing to instigate litigation on
behalf of their members. 13 The current problem lies in the application of
the parens patriae doctrine to Tribes. Specifically, in five Federal District
Court cases the Courts misinterpreted the requirements for parens patriae
standing laid down by the Supreme Court. According to the Supreme
Court's decisions on parens patriae, the Tribes in these cases should have
been recognized as having parens patriae standing, since they were litigat-
ing on behalf of a significant segment of their population. However, the
Tribes in each of the cases were found not to have standing since they
were not litigating on behalf of all of their members.
14
This Note argues that Tribes have parens patriae standing to protect
their citizens through litigation on their behalf, even if not all of their
citizens are engaged in the litigation. Part I examines the current re-
quirements of parens patriae standing, as articulated by the Supreme Court.
Part II briefly examines the nature of tribal sovereignty within American
jurisprudence and concludes that parens patriae standing is a retained right
of the Tribes. Part III examines the way in which the Federal District
Courts have incorrectly handled tribal parens patriae standing. This section
Judicial Dist., 831 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1987) (litigating on behalf of an "Indian child"
under the Indian Child Welfare Act); Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587
(10th Cir. 1985); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 810 F.2d 844, 865 n.16
(9th Cir. 1984) ("Similarly, the Tribe could have brought an action challenging Arizona's
vehicle taxes as a representative of or as parens patriae for its individual members, in order
to vindicate their individual rights.") (Fletcher, J., dissenting); Standing Rock Sioux In-
dian Tribe v. Dorgan, 505 F.2d 1135, 1137 (8th Cir. 1974) (litigating on behalf of
members to recover state taxes illegally collected from its members); Red Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians v. United States, 861 F. Supp. 841, 842 (D. Minn. 1994) (litigating on
behalf of tribal members to collect improperly collected state taxes); Rosebud Sioux Tribe
v. South Dakota, 709 F. Supp. 1502, 1503 (D.S.D. 1989) (litigating on behalf of mem-
bers); Apache County v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903, 906 (D.D.C. 1966).
The issue has been raised in other cases, but courts have avoided the question. See,
e.g., Pueblo of Isleta ex rel Lucero v. Universal Constructors, Inc., 570 F.2d 300, 302 n.2
(10th Cir. 1978) ("We need not decide whether the Tribe could bring the action because
of its parens patriae relationship to its members."); Village of Chalkyitsik v. M.S.F., 690
P.2d 10, 19 n.15 (Alaska 1984) ("There is ... no reason to reach Chalkyitsik's elaborate
arguments concerning its sovereign right to intervene and its parens patriae relationship to
[the Native American child in question].") (internal quotations omitted).
13. See Navajo Nation v. Super. Ct. of the State of Washington for Yakima County,
47 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1240 (E.D. Wash. 1999); Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas v.
Chacon, 46 F. Supp. 2d 644, 651-652 (W.D. Tex. 1999); Alabama and Coushatta Tribes
of Texas v. Trustees of the Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1327 (E.D.
Tex. 1993) (mem.); Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma v. Lujan, 728 F. Supp. 791, 795
(D.D.C. 1990).
14. See Navajo, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1240; Chacon, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 651-52; Big Sandy,
817 F. Supp. at 1327; Lujan, 728 F. Supp. at 795.
[VOL. 5:665
Protecting Native Americans
argues for a reexamination of Supreme Court doctrine when applying
parens patriae standing to Tribes. Part IV briefly examines permissible de-
fendants under Tribal parens patriae standing.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE
Parens patriae is the legal doctrine that provides standing for sover-
eign entities to bring suit on behalf of their " Derived from
British common law, the doctrine of parens patriae grew out of the royal
prerogative. 16 The King, as "father of the country," fulfilled the role of
guardian over individuals with legal disabilities-those who could not
protect themselves, such as "infants, idiots, and lunatics.,
17
American jurisprudence recognizes parens patriae standing only in
sovereign entities, such as States, Native American Tribes, and the Fed-
eral Government. 8 Although the Supreme Court recognizes parens patriae
15. See infa note 1.
16. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) ("Parens patriae originates
from the English common law where the King had a royal prerogative to act as guardian
to persons with legal disabilities such as infants."); George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career
ofParens Patriae: The State as Parent of Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. Rav. 895, 896-907 (1976)
(laying out the legal history and evolution of parens patriae); Scott Kerin, Alaska Sport
Fishing Association v. Exxon Corporation Highlights the Need to Take a Hard Look at the
Doctrine ofParens Patriae When Applied in Natural Resource Damage Litigation, 25 ENVTL. L.
897, 920 (1995); Michael Malina & Michael Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble
Damages Under Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. L. REv. 193, 197-202 (1970); Jim Ryan & Don
R. Sampen, Suing on Behalf of the State: A Parens Patriae Primer, 86 ILL. B.J. 684, 684
(1998).
17. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982); Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Com. of California, 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) ("This concept of parens
patriae is derived from the English constitutional system. As the system developed from its
feudal beginnings, the King retained certain duties and powers, which were referred to as
the 'royal prerogative.' These powers and duties were said to be exercised by the King in
his capacity as 'father of the country.' Traditionally, the term was used to refer to the
King's power as guardian of persons under legal disabilities to act for themselves.")
(citations omitted); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47 ("He is the general
guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics, and has the general superintendence of all
charitable uses in the kingdom.") (citations omitted); Curtis, supra note 16, at 896; Kerin,
supra note 16, at 920; Malina & Blechman, supra note 16, at 197-202; Ryan & Sampen,
supra note 16, at 684.
18. Political subdivisions, like municipalities, have been held to lack parens patriae
standing since they are not sovereign entities. See Pyan & Sampen, supra note 16, at 686
(citing Board of Educ. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 810 F.2d 707, 711-712 (7th Cir.
1987); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th
Cir. 1973)).
Foreign governments do not have parens patriae standing to litigate on behalf of
their "citizens and their American descendants." Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. Decoster,
59 F. Supp. 2d 120, 124-125 (D. Me. 1999). This holding does not bar Tribal parens
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standing in the Federal Government,' 9 the Court chooses to speak in
terms of States' rights and responsibilities, further noting that the "parens
patriae functions of the King passed to the States. ' 20 When Puerto Rico
litigated under parens patriae, the Supreme Court chose to read the sover-
eignty requirements for parens patriae standing broadly. 2' The Court
explained that since "Puerto Rico is similarly situated to a State ... [it]
has a claim to represent its quasi-sovereign interests in federal court at
least as strong as that of any State.,
22
The doctrine of parens patriae has been significantly expanded under
American common law.23 As under British common law, the current
patriae standing, within this jurisdiction, though, since the Supreme Court has specifically
found that Tribes are not foreign nations. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 20 (1831) ("The court has bestowed its best attention on this question, and, after
mature deliberation, the majority is of opinion that an Indian tribe or nation within the
United States is not a foreign state in the sense of the constitution.").
19. See Curtis, supra note 16, at 911 n.71 (citing F.P.C. v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,
362 U.S. 99 (1960)). See also Northern Paiute Nation v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 401
(Cl. Ct. 1986) ("It is established that ... the Federal Government or any Federal agency
... [can] represent [citizens] as parens patriae in their relation to the Federal Government.
Since the Tribe, in relation to the Federal Government, is lower in the hierarchy of gov-
ernments, somewhat akin to a state, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the Tribe
cannot litigate as parens patriae against the Federal Government on behalf of its mem-
bers.") (internal cites and quotations omitted). Cf CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 2.3, at
113 ("The ability of the federal government to sue in a parens patriae capacity is much
more uncertain.").
20. Hawaii, 405 U.S. at 257. Accord Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608 n.15; BLACK'S LAw DIc-
TIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) ("In the United States, the parens patriae function belongs
with the states."); Kerin, supra note 16, at 920 ("Early common law held that ... parens
patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State ... [and] is a most beneficent
function ... often necessary to be exercised in the interests of humanity, and for the pre-
vention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.") (citing Mormon Church v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)); Malina & Blechman, supra note 16, at 197 ("With
the American Revolution, these powers of the English King passed to the governments of
the several States and, after the adoption of the Constitution, in part to the federal gov-
ernment of the new Republic.") (citations omitted).
21. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608 n.15.
22. id.
23. See Hawaii, 405 U.S. at 257-58.
The nature of the parens patriae suit has been greatly expanded in the
United States beyond that which existed in England. This expansion was
first evidenced in Louisiana v. Texas, a case in which the State of Louisi-
ana brought suit to enjoin officials of the State of Texas from so
administering the Texas quarantine regulations as to prevent Louisiana
merchants from sending goods into Texas. This Court recognized that
Louisiana was attempting to sue, not because of any particular injury to a
business of the State, but as parens patriae for all her citizens. While the
Court found that parens patriae could not properly be invoked in that
Protecting Native Americans
doctrine of parens patriae allows sovereign entities to bring suit for the
protection and well-being of their citizens, but representation is not lim-
ited to those who are legally disabled.24 In the United States, a sovereign
can sue on behalf of those who cannot sue for themselves and on behalf
of some or all of its citizens in order to protect its quasi-sovereign inter-
25
ests.
Although the Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of parens
patriae in 1900, it did not significantly elaborate upon it until the 1982
26Snapp decision. The Court, dealing with the claims brought by States,
has developed two conditions for sovereigns to claim parens patriae stand-
ing when not suing on behalf of those who cannot sue for themselves .
First, the sovereign entity "must express a quasi-sovereign interest. ' '2' The
Court specifically distinguished quasi-sovereign interests of a State from
sovereign and non-sovereign interests. 29 First:
[S]overeign interests are easily identified: First, the exer-
cise of sovereign power over individuals and entities with
the relevant jurisdiction-this involves the power to create
and enforce a legal code .... [S]econd, the demand for
case, the propriety and utility of parens patriae suits were clearly recog-
nized.
Id. (citations omitted).
24. The traditional functions of the King, that of protector of individuals, "has rela-
tively little to do with the concept of parens patriae standing that has developed in
American law." Instead:
At a fairly early date, American courts recognized this common-law con-
cept, but now in the form of a legislative prerogative: "This prerogative
of parens patriae is often necessary to be exercised in the interests of hu-
manity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect
themselves.
Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600 (citing Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)).
25. See Hawaii, 405 U.S. at 258 (recognizing "the right of a State to sue as parens
patriae to prevent or repair harm to its 'quasi sovereign' interests"); Ryan & Sampen, supra
note 16, at 684-85.
26. See Ryan & Sampen, supra note 16, at 684-85 (referencing Snapp and Louisiana v.
Texas).
27. See, e.g., Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601-07 (1982); see also Ryan & Sampen, supra note
16, at 684-685.
28. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
29. See id. at 601 ("Its nature is perhaps best understood by comparing it to other
kinds of interests that a State may pursue.").
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recognition from other sovereigns-most frequently this in-
volves the maintenance and recognition of borders. 3
The Court then distinguishes quasi-sovereign interests from two
types of non-sovereign interests:
First, like other associations and private parties, a State is
bound to have a variety of proprietary interests .... Sec-
ond, a State may, for a variety of reasons, attempt to pursue
the interests of a private party, and pursue those interests
31only for the sake of the real party in interest.
The Court stated that quasi-sovereign interests "consist[ ] of a set of
interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace. 3 2 Although
the Court has not defined quasi-sovereign interest, it has articulated two
categories of quasi-sovereign interests that trigger parens patriae standing.3
"[A] State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being-
both physical and economic-of its residents in general., 34 The Court
also allows standing when "a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not
being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal sys-
tem., 3 For example, in Snapp, Puerto Rico filed suit against "numerous
individuals and companies engaged in the apple industry in Virginia,"
asserting the rights of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers who were de-
nied work in violation of the Wagner-Peyser Act.3 The Court found that
30. Id.
31. Id. at 601-02.
32. Id. at 602.
33. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at § 2.3, at 112-13.
34. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. In 11 Cornwell, the State of New York filed suit on be-
half of its mentally retarded citizens for being denied the opportunity to have a
community residence in a particular house. See New York v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d
34 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 718 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1983). The Second Cir-
cuit stated:
Both retarded persons and community residents are deprived of being
able to live in integrated communities. The analogy to racial discrimina-
tion is close indeed. Thus, the State of New York's interest in "the
health and well-being... of its residents in general, the primary category
of quasi-sovereign interests, is clearly implicated here.
Id. at 39 (internal citations omitted).
35. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. The Snapp Court explained: "we find that Puerto Rico
does have parens patriae standing to pursue the interests of its residents in the Common-
wealth's fall and equal participation in the federal employment service scheme established
pursuant to the Wagner-Peyser Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Id.
at 609.
36. Id. at 597.
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Puerto Rico had parens patriae standing that fell into both categories:
Puerto Rico was acting in the interest of its citizens' health and well-
being,37 and on behalf of its citizens' rights to participate in the federal
system and have all federal rights applied to them.38
The second requirement for parens patriae standing is that the State's
litigation be on behalf of a "substantial portion of the State's popula-
tion., 39 The Court first articulated this requirement in 1923, in a suit on
behalf of citizens using natural gas: "[t]he private consumers in each state
not only include most of the inhabitants of many urban communities but
constitute a substantial portion of the State's population. 4 0 The Court in
Snapp rephrased this requirement to "sufficiently substantial segment of its
population.
4 1
The Court has refrained from defining the exact proportion of the
population required to create standing.42 However, the Court has said that
a court must consider the "indirect effects of the injury" in addition to
the direct impact "in determining whether the State has alleged injury to
a sufficient substantial segment of its population."43 For example, regard-
less of the fact that only 787 jobs were specifically at issue in Snapp, the
Court found that Puerto Rico met the burden since "[d]eliberate efforts
to stigmatize the labor force as inferior carry a universal sting.""
II. TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN ENTITIES HAVE RETAINED
PARENS PATRIAE STANDING
Parens patriae standing exists only in sovereign entities. 4 The Court
explains the link between sovereignty and parens patriae standing as the
37. See id. at 609.
38. See id at 609-10.
39. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923).
40. Id.
41. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
42. See id. ("The Court has not attempted to draw any definitive limits on the pro-
portion of the population of the State that must be adversely affected by the challenged
behavior.").
43. Id.
44. Id. at 609 (quotations omitted).
45. See supra text accompanying note 2; Ryan & Sampsen, supra note 16, at 686; see
also Board of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 810 F.2d 707, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the Illinois State Board of Education lacks standing to seek a remedy for
racial discrimination by a local school board because it lacks the statutory and constitu-
tional authority and because the State's Attorney General can sue to vindicate children's
rights); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th
Cir. 1973) (holding that the Federal Government and the States may sue as parens patriae
but that political subdivisions, such as cities, cannot).
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right to represent quasi-sovereign interests. This Part addresses the nexus
between tribal sovereignty and tribal ability to represent quasi-sovereign
interests as defined in Snapp. First, this Part examines the nature of tribal
sovereignty. Second, this Part argues that the relationship between the
Federal Government and Tribes is not a bar to parens patriae standing.
Third, this Part asserts that although the framework of tribal sovereignty
as a retained right is problematic, modern parens patriae standing exists
within this paradigm. Finally, this Part recognizes that the States do not
adequately represent individual Native Americans as parens patriae because
States are often at odds with individual Native Americans and Tribes over
the nature of tribal sovereignty and property rights.
A. The Nature of Tribal Sovereignty
As Frank Pommersheim notes, "[a] substantial amount of the adver-
sity and difficulty present throughout the history of Indian law stems from
the fact that the tribal sovereign is consistently marginalized, if even dis-
cussed, in the context of our constitutional democracy. 4 7 Although the
Federal Government recognizes the inherent sovereign rights of Tribes,
acceptance and enforcement of tribal sovereignty is difficult given the
lack of general education and understanding of tribal rights.48 To give
context and understanding to tribal parens patriae standing, a brief discus-
sion of the sovereign powers retained by Tribes is warranted.
As Felix Cohen recognized in the first edition of his frequently-cited
handbook, each Tribe has the right to self-government:
The most basic of all Indian rights, the right of self-
government, is the Indian's last defense against administra-
tive oppression, for in a realm where the states are
powerless to govern and where Congress, occupied with
more pressing national affairs, cannot govern wisely and
well, there remains a large no-man's-land in which gov-
ernment can emanate only from officials of the Interior
Department or from the Indians themselves. Self-
46. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608 n.15.
47. Frank Pommersheim, "Our Federalism" in the Context of Federal Courts and Tribal
Courts: An Open Letter to the Federal Courts' Teaching and Scholarly Community, 71 U.
CoLO. L. Rav. 123, 127 (2000). Professor Pommersheim continues, "[a]ny survey, how-
ever cursory, of federal courts' texts and casebooks reveals the complete lack of any
discussion of tribal courts within the federal system." Id. at 129.
48. See generally id.
[VOL. 5:665
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government is thus the Indians' only alternative to rule by
a government department.
49
The basis for federal recognition of Tribes' governmental rights re-
sides not in the Constitution but in three Supreme Court decisions,
commonly known as the Marshall Trilogy.0 These cases provide the
foundation upon which sovereign and property relationships between
Tribes, States, and the Federal government are understood.5' In addition,
the sovereign rights of indigenous Tribes are not granted by the United
States Constitution or by the Federal Government, but are rights retained
from pre-contact.5 2 The Supreme Court has stated:
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique
and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of
49. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK or FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1st ed. 1945).
50. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
As part of the Marshall trilogy, the Supreme Court has held that the Indian Commerce
Clause restricted State interactions with and jurisdiction over Tribes. See Worcester, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) at 580-81, 590-92. Since State jurisdiction over Indian land is limited,
whether or not a piece of land is considered Indian Country has become extremely im-
portant. See, e.g., Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998)
(involving a dispute over whether tribal land constituted "Indian country," which would
give the Tribe power to tax nonmembers of the Tribe); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux
Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (regarding a dispute over whether federal environmental
regulations apply to unallotted, non-Indian land that falls within the reservation's original
1858 boundaries); Indian Country in Alaska: The Venetie Decision, JUSTICE, Spring 1997;
U.S. Supreme Court Issues Ruling in Alaska Tribal Sovereignty Case, NARF LEGAL REVIEW,
Winter/Spring 1998, at 5-7. Indian country is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978).
A federal right, as opposed to a state's right, to deal with Native Tribes, is, how-
ever, founded in Constitutional provisions. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate
Commerce with. . . the Indian Tribes"); Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559 ("[Tlhis article
... confers on congress the powers ... of regulating commerce ... with the Indian tribes.
These powers comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with
the Indians.") (emphasis in original).
51. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 590-92 (holding that the Federal Government
had the exclusive right, as opposed to States, to deal with Native American Tribes);
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 ("[Tribes] may, more correctly, perhaps, be de-
nominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a tide
independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right
of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.") (emphasis added); McIntosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587 (holding that the Federal Government had the exclusive right to
extinguish aboriginal tide).
52. The term "contact" refers to the first interactions between Europeans and indige-
nous peoples in the Western hemisphere. "Discovery" and other commonly used terms,
beside being Euro-centric, ignore the reciprocal impacts between continents and multiple
groups of people. "Contact" more accurately reflects the nature of the meetings of these
peoples and the subsequent impacts.
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Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until
Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign pow-
ers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by impli-
cation as a necessary result of their dependent status.5
3
The Federal Government has repeatedly acknowledged and sup-
ported Tribes' "quasi-sovereign interest[s] in the health and well-being-
both physical and economic-of [their] residents in general."- 4 According
to Cohen:
Indian self-government, the decided cases hold, includes the
power of an Indian tribe to adopt and operate under a form
of government of the Indian's choosing, to define condi-
tions of tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations of
members, to prescribe rules of inheritance, to levy taxes, to
regulate property within the jurisdiction of the tribe, to
control the conduct of members by municipal legislation,
and to administer justice.-"
Today, Tribes have retained criminal jurisdiction over member and non-
member Indians,56 as well as civil jurisdiction over a wide range of
53. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (holding that the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not apply when a criminal defendant is tried by both Tribal and
federal courts, since sovereignty does not derive from the same source). Cohen notes:
Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of
decisions ... is the principle that those powers which are lawfilly vested
in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by ex-
press acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished. Each Indian tribe begins
its relationship with the Federal Government as a sovereign power, rec-
ognized as such in treaty and legislation. The powers of sovereignty have
been limited from time to time by special treaties and laws designed to
take from Indian tribes control of matters which, in the judgment of
Congress, these tribes could no longer be safely permitted to handle. The
statutes of Congress, then, must be examined to determine the limitations
of tribal sovereignty rather than to determine its sources or its positive
content. What is not expressly limited remains within the domain of
tribal sovereignty.
COHEN, supra note 49, at 122.
54. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)
(describing the quasi-sovereign interests required for parens patriae standing).
55. COHEN, supra note 49, at 122.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Weaselhead, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
120 S. Ct. 82 (1999); Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 313; Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556
(1883); see also Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey
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subjects.17 Tribes have a great amount of control over child custody,
8
hunting and fishing, 9 gaming on the reservations, health services 6 hu-
62 63man remains and other sacred and finerary objects,62 language use,
educational programs, ' and other governmental powers. In addition,
many Tribes have signed compacts with the Federal Government to take
control over services for their members that the Federal Government
previously had provided, including administration of hospitals and other
health clinics. 6 s Several Tribes have created tribal community colleges,6
while others have taken over public schools, 67 economic development
6" 69programs, 6 and housing.
Through aJurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIz. L. Rav. 503 (1976) (surveying the chaotic alloca-
tion of law enforcement authority over Indian lands between Federal, State, and Tribal
Courts).
57. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (finding that Tribes retained
subject matter jurisdiction over transactions between Native Americans and non-Native
Americans on the reservation); Oglala Sioux Tribe Develops Environmental Review Code,
NARF LEGAL REvIEw, Summer/Fall 1998, at 7-8 (discussing how the Oglala Sioux
Tribe has developed several programs to implement tribal health and environment laws).
58. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978); Fisher v. Dis-
trict Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386-88 (1976) (finding that Tribes retained exclusive
juisdiction to determine custody of a child when all parties were members and lived on
the reservation).
59. See, e.g., Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 239 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 280 (W.D. Mich. 1979) ("[Fishing rights do] not belong to
individual tribal members who exercise it, although the rights were reserved for every
individual Indian, as though named in the treaty. It is exercised by members of the plain-
tiff tribes under extensive tribal regulation.").
60. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
61. See Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
93-638.
62. See Native American Graves and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. 5§ 3001-3011
(1991).
63. See Native American Language Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1990).
64. See Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
93-638; Tribally Controlled Schools Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-297; Johnson-
O'Malley Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 1458.
65. See Bristol Bay Native Association, BBNA Programs (visited May 18, 2000)
<http://www.bbna.com/programs.htm>.
66. See, e.g., Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Community College, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3372, at *11 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a Tribal community college had sover-
eign immunity).
67. See Melody L. McCoy, Education and Tribal Sovereignty, 25 FED. BAR Assoc. IN-
DIAN LAW CONE. COURSE MATERIALS 253 (2000).
68. See Bristol Bay Native Association, supra note 65.
69. See id.
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B. The Federal Government as the "Great Father" is Not a Bar
to Tribal Parens Patriae Standing
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the relationship
between Tribes and Congress as "resembl[ing] that of a ward to his
guardian." 70 Based upon this notion, the trust and plenary power doc-
trines define the relationship between the Federal Government and
indigenous nations.7 ' The Federal Government has a fiduciary duty to
protect Tribes, but at the same time it preserves unilateral authority to
divest Tribal Governments of their sovereign and property rights. Given
70. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) ("They look to our
government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to
their wants; and address the president as their great fEther.").
71. See Passamaquoddy v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 375 (1st Cir. 1975) ("The general
notion of a 'trust relationship,' often called a guardian-ward relationship, has been used to
characterize the resulting relationship between the federal government and those tribes.");
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942):
Furthermore, this Court has recognized the distinctive obligation of trust
incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent
and sometimes exploited people. In carrying out its treaty obligations
with the Indian tribes, the Government is something more than a mere
contracting party. Under a humane and self imposed policy which has
found expression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of
this Court, it has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest re-
sponsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who
represent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by
the more exacting fiduciary standards.
Id. Recently, Justice Stevens noted:
Throughout our Nation's history, this Court has recognized both the
plenary power of Congress over the affairs of native Americans and the
fiduciary character of the special federal relationship with descendants of
those once sovereign peoples.
Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044, 1063 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) ("This aspect of tribal
sovereignty [here, sovereign immunity], like all others, is subject to the superior and ple-
nary control of Congress."); United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54
(1946) (plurality opinion) ("The power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of plenary
nature; but is not absolute.").
Black's Law Dictionary defines "plenary" as "[f]ull, complete; entire." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1175 (7th ed. 1999). Black's further defines "plenary power" as "[plower
that is broadly construed; esp., a court's power to dispose of any matter properly before
it." Id. at 1189. See generally Robert Laurence, Learning to Live With the Plenary Power of
Congress over the Indian Nations, 30 ARIz. L. Rav. 413 (1988); Robert Laurence, On
Eurocentrice Myopia, The Designated Hitter Rule and 'The Actual State of Things,' 30 ARIz. L.
REV. 459 (1988); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard
Trial of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L.
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the nature of the federal responsibility and the confined nature of tribal
powers allowed by the Federal Courts, the question arises whether a
Tribe maintains a sovereign relationship such that it can protect its citi-
73
zens.
First, the Federal Government's higher position in the hierarchy in
the federal system is not a bar to tribal parens patriae standing. The Su-
preme Court has held that States have parens patriae standing despite their
relative status to the Federal Government.74
Second, regardless of the relationship between the Tribe and the
Federal Government, the Tribe is a sovereign entity over its individual
citizens.7' The basic understanding of citizenship boils down to a social
contract theory, where individuals take on rights and responsibilities in
order to gain "protection, rights, and privileges" from the sovereign.
76
The relationship between the tribal entity and the individual members
does not stray from this model. For example, many Tribes try to address
juvenile delinquency and other problems faced by child members of the
Tribe through traditional dispute resolution. 77 Tribal Governments also
78
provide rights to their citizens, often through IRA constitutions or tra-
REy. 219 (1986); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live With Eurocentric Myopia: A
Reply to Professor Laurence's 'Learning to Live With the Plenary Power of Congress Over the
Indian Nations,' 30 ARiz. L. REv. 439 (1988).
73. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) ("Indian
tribes are proscribed from exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are
expressly terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsistent with their status.' ").
74. See Ryan & Sampen, supra note 16, at 686. However, parens patriae standing is
not clear when claims are brought against the Federal Government. See id; see also Alfred
L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982) ("A State does not
have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government."); Mas-
sachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923) ("[lI]t is the United States, and not the
State, which represents them as parens patriae."). For further discussion on the implications
of sovereign defendants, see infra Part IV.
75. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (holding that
the Santa Clara Pueblo had the sovereign right to adjudicate whether their membership
criteria discriminated based upon gender); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884)
(holding that individual Native Americans were not citizens of the United States because
of their tribal citizenship) (overturned by legislation in 1924); Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109
U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883) (holding that a Tribe had exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes
of members) (subsequent legislation has affected this holding).
76. Kevin Pimentel, Note, To Yick Wo, Thanks for Nothing!: Citizenship for Filipino
Veterans, 4 MIcH. J. RACE & L. 459, 460 (1999) (citing Will Kymlicka & Wayne Nor-
man, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHIcs 352,
352 (1994)).
77. See Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, 79 JUDICATURE
126 (1995) (arguing for a return to traditional institutions and methods of redress for In-
digenous communities).
78. See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1934).
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ditional means of governing. 79 The privileges that Tribes provide to their
members varies greatlyi0
The relationship between the Federal Government and indigenous
Tribes should not bar tribal parens patriae standing. Although the rela-
tionship between States and the Federal Government differs from that
between Tribes and the Federal Government, the judicial construction of
both as lower in the federal hierarchy should not bar standing. In addi-
tion, the relationship between the member and the Tribe is that of a
citizen and a sovereign. As such, not only should a Tribe have the ability
to litigate on behalf of its citizens, but it has a duty to protect them.
C. The Problem of Framing Tribal Sovereignty as Retained
In United States v. Wheeler, the Supreme Court held that tribal sover-
eign rights are retained from pre-contact.8 ' The Court constructed the
source of tribal governing rights as inherent rather than derived from fed-
eral designation as an answer to whether concurrent criminal trials, in
both Federal and Tribal Courts, amounted to Double Jeopardy.2 The
Court found no Double Jeopardy violation since tribal sovereign rights
were retained rather than constructed from the same source as federal
sovereignty.
8 3
By framing tribal sovereignty as retained, the Court problematically
left open the potential for the term retained to limit Tribal government
practices to those utilized prior to contact rather than to what is necessary
in the modem context. 4 This would make it difficult for Tribal govern-
ments to assert parens patriae standing, as the parens patriae doctrine was not
conceived of, let alone exercised, prior to litigation in United States
Courts.
79. For example, most Tribes allow members to vote and run for public office, but
others allow religious leaders in the community to appoint public officials. Since the Bill
of Rights does not limit the actions of Tribal Governments, Congress enacted the Indian
Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1968), which applies most provisions of the Bill of
Rights (but not separation of Church and State) to Native American Activities. See id.
80. Many Tribes provide governmental services, see supra Part II.B, as well as college
scholarships and other similar programs. Tribes also provide tradition, culture, and iden-
tity to their members, partially through cultural outreach programs. For example, many
Tribes offer language, dance, or arts and crafts workshops to their members.
81. See 435 U.S. 313, 324 (1978).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 324.
83. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 324.
84. The Court has used prior Tribal practices to limit property rights. See, e.g., Tee-
Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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However, tribes have sovereign immunity, which they also did not
have, of course, prior to contact. Thus, the term retained has not been
used to limit tribal sovereign immunity." For example, in Martinez, a suit
brought by a tribal member against her Tribe, the Court recognized that
the Indian Civil Rights Act did not abrogate sovereign immunity regard-
less of whether the Tribe exercised this right prior to the Federal
Constitution. 7 Thus, the term retained is merely a descriptive phrase, not
a limitation on Tribes' ability to exercise modem sovereign powers.8
D. The State is Insuffident as Parens Patriae
Parens patriae standing for Tribes does not bar the State from litigat-
ing on behalf of its Native American citizens. Filing suit under parens
patriae is within the sovereign's prerogative, after all; it is not mandatory.
By not providing Tribes the right to litigate on behalf of their citizens, a
substantial number of Native Americans are left unprotected.
The relationship between Native Americans and the State differs
from that of other citizens, especially when in Indian Country.89 Whether
85. See Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 357-58 (1919):
The Creek Nation was recognized by the United States as a distinct po-
litical community, with which it made treaties and which within its own
territory administered its internal affairs. Like other governments, mu-
nicipal as well as state, the Creek Nation was free from liability for
injuries to persons or property due to mob violence or failure to keep the
peace. Such liability is frequently imposed by statute upon cities and
counties (see City of Chicago v. Pennsylvania Co., 119 Fed. Rep. 497);
but neither Congress nor the Creek Nation had dealt with the subject by
any legislation prior to 1908.
Id. (internal citations omitted). See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-
59 (1978) (affirming Tribal sovereign immunity); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington
Dept. of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1977); United States v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1940); see also Cherokee Nation v. Babbitt, 117
F.3d 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (detailing the requirements to be considered a "Tribe" to
plead soveriegn immunity). See generally GETCHES ET AL., supra note 4, at 383-88.
86. See, e.g., Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58-59.
87. See id. at 58. The Court held that the Indian Civil Rights Act only abrogated
sovereign immunity in habeas corpus claims against Tribes. See id.
88. "Indian tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory to the extent that sovereignty has not been withdrawn by federal statute or
treaty." Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
89. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that
Tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians unless authorized by Congress);
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (affirming exclusive jurisdiction of Tribes
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a Federal,* State, and/or Tribal law governs over an individual depends
upon Tribal membership ° and the type of law applied.9' Further, the
Court has noted that "[Tribes] owe no allegiance to the States, and re-
ceive from them no protection. Because of local ill feelings, the people of
the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies., 92 Al-
though the relationship between Tribes and States has evolved over time,
the nature of the relationship tends to be adversarial, and disputes over93
jurisdiction, retained sovereignty, and treaty rights are common. Not
only is it often problematic for States to advocate on behalf of Tribal in-
terests, it is common for States' own sovereign interests to be directly
opposed to tribal members' well being.94 In most cases, the State would
not well serve the parens patriae function for the Native American citizens
residing within its borders.
III. TREATMENT OF TRIBAL PARENS PATRIAE STANDING
IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
This Part examines the incorrect application of parens patriae standing
to tribal entities. First, this Part discusses the seminal Assiniboine case,95
which first applied the wrong standard for parens patriae standing. The
nature of the misinterpretation will be examined by looking to current
Supreme Court holdings on parens patriae. Second, this Part considers
each of the four subsequent District Court cases in light of the Court's
parens patriae rulings. Third, this Part advocates the application of current
Supreme Court rulings on parens patriae to Tribal sovereigns.
over adoption proceedings when all parties are members of the Tribe and residing on the
reservation).
90. For example, membership within the forum Tribe is not required for criminal
cases, although membership within a federally recognized Tribe is mandatory. See, e.g.,
United States v. Weaselhead, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 82
(1999).
91. See generally Clinton, supra note 56.
92. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
93. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172
(1999); Alaska v. Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux, 522
U.S. 329 (1998); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Arizona v.
San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983); Washington v. Washington State Com-
mercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assoc., 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
94. For example, Yankton Sioux, a case determining the boundaries of a reservation,
arose out of a dispute over who had the power to regulate a landfill site. 522 U.S. at 329.
It was in the State's interests to regulate the landfill, while it was in the tribal members'
interests not to allow a landfill on or next to their reservation. See id.




A. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Montana
The State of Montana collected motor vehicle property and new car
taxes from members of the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes, even though
members were exempt from the taxes if domiciled on the reservation.'
The Tribes brought suit as parens patriae in the United States District
Court of Montana on behalf of their members living within the reserva-
tion for a return of the taxes collected plus interest. 97 The District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the State on several grounds, in-
cluding that the Tribe had not met the standard for parens patriae
standing.
9 8
The District Court held that in order to sue as parens patriae, the
Tribe was required to file on behalf of every member of the Tibe79 since
it was "convinced ... that the entity purporting to advance the [parens
patriae] claim must be acting on behalf of the collective interests of all of
its citizens."' ° In coming to this conclusion, the Assiniboine Court did not
look to recent Supreme Court cases, but relied primarily on dicta in Lou-
isiana v. Texas,t 'O a one hundred-year-old case that stated that "the state of
Louisiana presents herself in the attitude of parens patrioe [sic], trustee,
guardian, or representative of all of her citizens.
0 2
The Assiniboine court misinterpreted the Supreme Court's enuncia-
tion of the parens patriae doctrine as requiring suits to be brought on
behalf of all citizens.'03 The Supreme Court had clarified that entirety was
not required, as it applied the terms "substantial portion of the State's
population."'04 In fact, the year prior to the District Court's decision in
Assiniboine, the Supreme Court further articulated that:
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 280.
99. See id. at 277.
100. Id. ("[I]t can hardly be said that this lawsuit is on behalf of the interests of the
entire Fort Peck constituency.") (emphasis added).
101. 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900).
102. Id.
103. See Assiniboine, 568 F. Supp. at 277.
104. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923).
The private consumers in each state not only include most of the inhabi-
tants of many urban communities but constitute a substantial portion of the
state's population. Their health, comfort, and welfare are seriously jeop-
ardized by the threatened withdrawal of the gas from the interstate
stream. This is a matter of grave public concern in which the state, as the
representative of the public, has an interest apart from that of the indi-
viduals affected. It is not merely a remote or ethical interest, but one
which is immediate and recognized by law.
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The Court has not attempted to draw any definitive limits on
the proportion of the population of the State that must be ad-
versely affected by the challenged behavior. Although more
must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual
residents, the indirect effects of the injury must be considered
as well in determining whether the State has alleged injury to
a sufficient substantial segment of its population.05
Thus, the additional requirement of litigating on behalf of all citizens
should not be applied to States or other sovereigns seeking standing under
parens patriae; rather, the lesser standard of litigation on behalf of a signifi-
cant portion of the population is required. For example, in Snapp the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was able to litigate on behalf of its citi-
zens working as migrant farm-workers.'06 The State of New York was
allowed to file suit on behalf of its mentally retarded citizens. 10 7 States
have also filed anti-discrimination suits as parens patriae on behalf of a por-
tion of their citizens.' ° By looking to Louisiana v. Texas and not any
contemporary parens patriae cases, the Assiniboine Court incorrectly re-
quired litigation on behalf of every member of the Tribe. This mistake
barred the Tribe's standing to protect its citizens.
B. The Assiniboine Line of Cases
More problematic than the mistake in Assiniboine is the repeated reli-
ance on its holding. The District Courts have not investigated the
Supreme Court's elaboration of the parens patriae doctrine, but merely
have reiterated the holding of Assiniboine. In the four subsequent Federal
District Court cases, Tribes have been incorrectly barred from litigating as
parens patriae.
1. Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma v. Lujan'0°
Under the Texas Band of Kickapoo Act of 1983," ° Congress sepa-
rately recognized the Texas Band of Kickapoo as a subgroup of the
Id. (emphasis added). Accord Malina & Blechman, supra note 16, at 206-07.
105. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
106. See id.
107. See New York v. 11 Comwell Co., 695 F.2d 34, 39 (2nd Cir. 1982), vacated on
other grounds, 718 F.2d 22 (2nd Cir. 1983).
108. See, e.g., New York v. Peter & John's Pump House, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 809
(N.D.N.Y. 1996).
109. 728 F. Supp. 791 (D.D.C. 1990).
110. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1300b-11-1300b-16 (1983).
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Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma."' The Texas branch submitted a constitu-
tion under the name "Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas" to the
Bureau of Indian Affairs in order to separate from the Oklahoma Tribe."
2
The Oklahoma Tribe then appointed a new Council for the Texas Band,
and the new council objected to the Bureau of Indian Affairs' election to
seek ratification of the Tribal Constitution (which is part of the recogni-
tion process)."' Nonetheless, the Tribal Constitution was passed by a vast
majority of the Texas members.'14 The Oklahoma Kickapoo Tribe sued,
attempting to enjoin the Federal Government from establishing separate
government-to-government relations with the Texas branch." 5
Citing Assiniboine, the District Court denied standing to the Kicka-
poo Tribe of Oklahoma, holding that "a sovereign tribe must be acting
on behalf of all of its members in order to litigate as parens patriae.'' 16 The
Court used the Assiniboine misinterpretation, instead of looking at current
Supreme Court opinions on parens patriae, to bar standing, even though
the litigation was on behalf of a "substantial segment of its population.""1
7
The Lujan Court noted that "[w]hile all members of the Tribe may in
some way be affected by the Band's reorganization, the Tribe would not
be representing the interests of all members as the doctrine of parens pa-
triae requires."" 8 In this statement, the District Court made two
fundamental mistakes based upon the parens patriae doctrine laid out by
the Supreme Court. First, the Court did not take into account indirect
effects to determine whether the litigation was on behalf of a significant
segment of the population." 9 Second, the Court failed to acknowledge
that whether the sovereign "is doing more harm than good to her own
citizens[] is for her to determine."'20 By seeking to intervene in the reor-
ganization of the Texas branch of the Kickapoo Tribe, the Kickapoo
Tribe of Oklahoma had the right to decide what was in the best interests
of its membership; the District Court did not. If the Lujan Court had
111. See id. With federal recognition comes all the retained rights to self-government
as well as federal services provided to Native American Tribes.
112. See Lujan, 728 F. Supp. at 792.
113. See id. at 792-793.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 795.
117. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
118. Lujan, 728 F. Supp. at 795.
119. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.
120. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907).
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correctly applied the parens patriae doctrine, the Tribe would have had
standing to bring this suit."'
2. Alabama & Coushatta Tribes of Texas v. Trustees of the
Big Sandy Independent School DistriCt122
The Big Sandy case arose out of a dispute over a school dress code,
which restricted male students' hair length.'2 Specifically:
Boys' hair should be of reasonable length and style so as not
[to] interfere with the instructional program. Boys' hair
should [be] no longer than the top of a standard dress col-
lar. 124
To members of the Alabama and Coushatta Tribes, though, long
hair has religious significance. 12' The Big Sandy Court noted the common
impact of the School's rule upon the Tribe's religious beliefs:
It was a common Native American belief that the hair,
similar to other body parts, was sacred, and that to cut the
hair was a complicated and significant procedure. A hair cut
was considered the equivalent of dismemberment of a body
part. Generally, hair was to be cut only as a sign of mourn-
ing a close family member's death. Southeastern tribes
believed that, to cut the hair at any other time, without the
safeguards of tribal ritual, would disrupt the 'oneness' of the
person's spirit and subject that person's body to invasion by
witchcraft. 126
At the time of the lawsuit, eighty-nine members of the student body
were Tribal members. 127 The prohibition was enforced only against
121. Although the Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma would have had parens patriae stand-
ing, the Court found that the Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas was an indispensable
party, and thus was immune from suit. See Lujan, 728 F. Supp. at 796-97. Therefore, the
suit would likely have been dismissed anyway, but on different grounds.
122. 817 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (mem.).
123. See id. at 1320.
124. Id. at 1323 (citing dress code).
125. See id. at 1324-1325 (citing Professor Hiram Gregory's testimony on behalf of
the Tribe).
126. Id. at 1323-1325. Accord Timothy S. Zahniser, Note, Alabama & Coushatta
Tribes v. Big Sandy School District: The Right of Native American Public School Students to
Wear Long Hair, 19 Am. INDIAN L. R-v. 217, 228 (1994).
127. See Big Sandy, 817 F. Supp. at 1324.
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Native American students.128 Four students, under threat of expulsion,
chose to cut their hair.' 9 Another six refused and were taken out of class
and placed in in-school detention." Although those students were given
the same homework assignments as other students in their classes, they
were denied access to classroom instruction."' Generally, the students fell
behind in their school work.
13 2
Adult members of the Tribe and Tribal administrators endeavored to
intervene on the students' behalf, appearing at school board meetings in
an unsuccessful attempt to have the dress code revised.1 33 At one meeting,
a member of the school board told a Tribal member that long hair had
gone out with the hippies, after the member addressed the board about
the religious significance of wearing long hair.
134
The Big Sandy Court did not cite any current parens patriae Supreme
Court cases. Instead, the Court cited the misinterpretation in Assiniboine
and Lujan, and held that the Tribe did not have parens patriae standing
since "the Tribe is not representing the interests of all its members in this
case, as the doctrine of parens patriae requires." 3 ' Like the Lujan Court,
the District Court recognized that "the application of the hair restriction
may in some way affect members of the Tribe other than the Native
American students at Big Sandy and their families," 36 but the Big Sandy
Court did not take this into account, even though it was required to do
so to determine whether the litigation was for the benefit of a significant
segment of the population.13 7 While the Big Sandy Court ruled on the
merits of the individual plaintiffi' claims, the misapplication of the parens
patriae doctrine incorrectly barred standing for the Alabama and Coushatta
Tribes.
3. Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas v. Chacon
138
On March 2, 1999, emergency personnel received a phone call that






133. See id. at 1326.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 1323.
136. Id.
137. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
138. 46 F. Supp. 2d 644 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
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arrived, she was already dead.'40 Martha Chacon, the Justice of the Peace,
was notified of the death by Sheriffs deputies. Since Norma Rodriguez
was a known inhalant abuser, they assumed that was the cause of death.
4 1
Chacon found no signs that this was the actual cause of death on the
body. 42 When Rodriguez's mother, Ms. Elizondo, arrived, she repeatedly
stated that "someone killed her, I know someone killed her.'
43
Chacon decided that an autopsy was necessary to determine whether
Ms. Rodriguez had been murdered, and she obtained permission from
Rodriguez's mother.'" While preparing an autopsy order, Chacon re-
ceived a phone call from the funeral home stating that Tribal members
and the Tribe's Chief had requested that the autopsy not be performed.
4
1
Chacon agreed to meet with Tribal members at the Tribal offices that
night, after receiving numerous calls from Tribal members and county
officials.' 6 At the meeting, Chacon informed the Tribe that she intended
to have the autopsy performed, regardless of their wishes.
47
Later that night, Ricardo Calderon, an attorney for the Tribe, called
Chacon to explain the Tribe's religious objection to having an autopsy
performed upon Ms. Rodriguez, but Chacon did not change her mind.
4 8
The funeral home, at some point that night, turned the body over to the
Tribe, which buried her on Tribal lands.' 49 Chacon, furious and recalci-
trant, demanded that Rodriguez' body be disintered.'O
The Texas Kickapoo Tribe immediately filed suit, seeking a de-
claratory judgment on two claims.'5 ' First, that the order for
"disinterment and autopsy of Rodriguez's body is void because it does
not comply with the Native American Graves Protection and Repatria-
tion Act.' ' 5 2 Second, that disinterment was a violation of the Tribes' First










145. See id. at 647.
146. See id. at 646-647.





152. Id. at 649.
153. See id. at 651.
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Assistant Attorney General Michael Winget-Hernandez wanted the
autopsy performed as well as a ruling on the merits. 1s4 The State wanted
the District Court to interpret the Native American Grave and Repatria-
tion Act not to bar current murder investigations." s In order to gain a
ruling on the merits, the State waived a challenge to parens patriae stand-
ing when the Court raised the issue in oral argument.1 16 In addition,
neither side of the litigation briefed the issue of parens patriae standing.
1 7
In holding that the Tribe did not have parens patriae standing on the
First Amendment question, the Chacon court stated that "cases in which
the parens patriae doctrine applies have been limited to those involving the
rights of the Tribe members as a whole, and not those of just one or sev-
eral members. 1 8 Thus, the Court could "not agree that the Tribe ha[d]
demonstrated that it ha[d] standing under the parens patriae doctrine ...
because the rights which it seeks to assert are primarily those of a small
group of Tribe members[] and not those of the Tribe as a whole."' ' The
District Court cited Big Sandy, Lujan, and Assiniboine in support of this
holding, rather than looking at current Supreme Court rulings on parens
patriae standing.'6° Again, a District Court applied the wrong standard;
parens patriae standing requires litigation to be on behalf of only a signifi-
cant segment of the population rather than on the entire membership.
161
The Court also did not take into account the indirect effect of the injury.
Similar to Snapp, the disregard of a Tribe's members' religious beliefs
"carr[ies] a universal sting. 1 61 If the District Court had applied the parens
patriae doctrine correctly, the Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas would
have had parens patriae standing. 
63
154. See Telephone Interview with Michael Winget-Hernandez, Assistant Attorney




158. Chacon, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 652.
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. See id. at 652.
161. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
162. Id. at 609 (quotations omitted).
163. The Chacon Court chose to rule on the merits given the possibility that the Court
"misconstrued the parens patriae doctrine or that the Tribe as a whole has otherwise suf-
fered injury sufficient to confer Article III standing." Id. at 651. The Court found no
constitutional violation. See id.
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4. Navajo Nation v. Superior Court of Washington for Yakima County'6
Navajo, concerning the adoption of a Native American child, fo-
cused on whether or not the Superior Court correctly followed the
procedure delineated in the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1975
("ICWA").1 6' K.H. was born of Navajo, Yakama, and Nez Perce ances-
try.' 66 Her parents had been living on the Yakama reservation, but moved
to Yakima, Washington to hide the pregnancy from their families.
1 67
K.H.'s parents gave her up for adoption in State court, signing documents
stating that K.H. was not an Indian child. Thus, neither the Yakama nor
Navajo Tribes were notified of the adoption, as required by ICWA.1 ,
Years later, K.H.'s birth mother informed her family about the child, and
the families later informed both Tribes. '69 The Navajo Nation filed suit to
challenge the adoption, and the Yakama Nation filed to intervene.
1 70
The Navajo court found that the Navajo Nation did not have parens
patriae standing to file suit, stating that the "Navajo Nation ha[d] failed to
prove it [wals acting on behalf of all of its members. 7 1 Once again, a
District Court cited Assiniboine, Lujan, and Big Sandy in support of its
holding rather than current Supreme Court cases.1 7 ' Thus, a District
Court again misapplied the standard for parens patriae standing.
The court also failed to recognize Tribes' traditional usage of par-
ens patriae. The court found that the Tribe was representing only the
grandparent's rights;1 73 but the Tribe does, in fact, have an interest in
the well-being of its children. 174 Today, States, under their parens patriae
164. 47 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
165. 25 U.S.C. § 1901-1921.




170. See id. at 1236-37.
171. Id. at 1240.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 1240 ("[T]he Navajo Nation does not have standing to assert claims and
rights of the grandparents that are so personal to individual to the Strongs.").
174. See Indian Child Welfire Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1978) ("[T]here is no re-
source that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than
their children."). Moreover, under the British common law origins of the parens patriae
doctrine, the sovereign unquestionably had an interest in the well-being of the children. See
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990); see also Curtis, supra note 16, at 898-907
("English children who received royal protection had not violated the norms of society;
rather, they had summoned the case of the realm because of their dependent and proper-
tied status."); Christine Steib Stickler, Note, In re S.G.: Parens Partiae and Wardship
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responsibilities, continue to work in the interests of their children.'75
Similarly, the Tribe should have been able to litigate under the parens pa-
triae doctrine on behalf of its child.
C. Courts Should Look to Current Supreme Court Rulings on Parens Patriae
The additional misguided requirement placed on Tribes asserting
parens patriae standing-that litigation must be on behalf of all members-
has been used to bar standing repeatedly. Assiniboine has been cited often,
without regard to the correct Supreme Court interpretation of parens pa-
triae requirements, to support findings that Tribes lack standing. 176 In the
future, Courts looking at Tribal parens patriae standing should examine
how the Supreme Court has laid out the parens patriae doctrine. There is
simply no reason why Tribes should be required to meet a higher stan-
dard than other sovereignties when litigating on behalf of their citizens.
The five aforementioned district courts never reached the question
of Tribes' quasi-sovereign interests, since standing was barred because the
litigation was not brought on behalf of the entire tribal memberships. In a
footnote in Snapp, the Supreme Court noted that Puerto Rico had parens
patriae standing because it was "similarly situated to a State," as "[it has a
claim to represent its quasi-sovereign interests in federal court at least as
strong as that of any State. ' ' 77 Applying this rationale to Tribes, the ques-
tion is therefore whether a Tribe has "at least as strong" of "a claim to
represent its quasi-sovereign interests" as States.
7 8
Quasi-sovereign interests fall into two categories: protecting the
well-being of citizens and preserving the benefits that flow to citizens
through participation in the federal system. 79 First, like other sovereign
entities, Tribes care about the well-being of their citizens.'8 In Navajo,
the Tribe filed suit to ensure that the Indian Child Welfare Act was fol-
lowed, so that connections between Native American children and their
Proceedings-Exactly Who in the State Should Determine the Best Interests of the Child, 7 WID-
ENER J. PuB. L. 377, 379-82 (1998).
175. See generally Daniel B. Griffith, The Best Interests Standard: A Comparison of the
State's Parens Patriae Authority and Judicial Oversight in Best Interests Determinations for Chil-
dren and Incompetent Parents, 7 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 283 (1991); Kay P. Kindred, God Bless
the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a State Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO
ST. L.J. 519 (1996); Stickler, supra note 174.
176. See Navajo, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1240; Chacon, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 651-52; Big Sandy,
817 F. Supp. at 1327; Lujan, 728 F. Supp. at 795.
177. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608 n.15.
178. Id.
179. See id., at 607-08.
180. See, e.g., Big Sandy, 817 F. Supp. at 1327.
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Tribes would not be severed; 8 l maintaining those connections benefit
both the child and the Tribe. In Chacon, the Tribe attempted to protect
its members' religious rights, as well as their well-being. 182 Similarly, the
Tribes in Big Sandy asserted the religious rights of their juvenile members
by bringing suit against the School District. 8 3 There is little question that
the Tribes were acting on behalf of their members' "health and well-
being--both physical and economic. ' ' O
Second, as in Snapp, the Tribe has a quasi-sovereign interest in en-
suring its citizens and it are not discriminatorily denied the benefits of the
federal system. 8 The Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas, in Chacon,
filed to enforce Constitutional rights on behalf of its members,'1 6 as did
the Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas in Big Sandy.18 7 Tribes have
shown that they have legitimate quasi-sovereign interests under both
categories.
IV. PERMISSIBLE DEFENDANTS
Given that the parens patriae cases before the Supreme Court have
been limited to State and Federal government plaintiffi, the discussion of
permissible defendants has been limited. Although States, local govern-
ments, and private defendants have been called before the Courts under
parens patriae, Eleventh Amendment'8 and other immunity defenses have
not been significantly raised since the plaintiffs have been either States or
the Federal government. 9
Parens patriae standing does not trump a sovereign entity's immunity
from suit, and although suits against States are allowed if brought by other
States or the Federal government, suits brought by Tribes under parens
patriae standing pose significant immunity problems. Specifically, the Su-
preme Court has read the Eleventh Amendment to bars suits brought by
181. See 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1233.
182. See 46 F. Supp. 2d at 644.
183. See 817 F. Supp. at 1319.
184. Alfred Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
185. See id.
186. See 46 F. Supp. 2d at 644.
187. See 817 F. Supp. at 1319.
188. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
189. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Missouri
v. Illinois Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); United States v. City of Jack-
son, 318 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1963).
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foreign nations' 9° and Tribes. 9' Although there are exceptions to the
Eleventh Amendment bar,9 parens patriae standing does not per se cir-
cumvent sovereign immunity.'"
190. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
191. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see also Standing
Rock Sioux Indian Tribe v. Dorgan, 505 F.2d 1135, 1139-41 (8th Cir. 1974).
192. Seegenerally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at §§ 7.5-7.7.
193. Although Chemerinsky argues that States ought to be able to bring suit against
the Federal Government as parens patriae, see id. at 113 (Allowing states to sue the federal
government on behalf of its citizens might provide essential protection, just as such suits
are often important against private parties."), the Supreme Court has not agreed. The
Court stressed this point in Snapp: "a State does not have standing as parens patriae to bring
an action against the Federal Government." Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,
458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982). Similarly, the Court of Claims has remarked, "[slince the
Tribe, in relation to the Federal Government, is lower in the hierarchy of governments,
somewhat akin to a state, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the Tribe cannot
litigate as a parens patriae against the Federal Government on behalf of its members."
Northern Paiute Nation v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 401, 406-08 (Cl. Ct. 1986). The
Northern Paiute Nation attempted to sue the Federal Government for breaching its duty
to the members for not providing an irrigation system under the Indian Claims Conunis-
sion Act. See id; see also Larry W. Yackle, A Worthy Champion For Fourteenth Amendment
Rights: The United States in Parens Patriae, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 111 (1997) (arguing that
the executive branch ought to have parens patriae standing in Fourteenth Amendment
cases absent specific congressional authorization).
The Court of Claims stated that it considers the Federal government's relationship
toward individual Native Americans trumps that of Tribes to their members. Native
American citizenship in the United States can be revoked simply by Congressional repeal
of the Citizenship Act of 1924. The Supreme Court, in Elk v. Wilkins, denied United
States citizenship to an individual Native American, despite the Fourteenth Amendment,
because of the relationship to his Tribe. 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884):
The alien and dependent condition of the members of the Indian tribes
could not be put off at their own will without the action or assent of the
United States. They were never deemed citizens of the United States,
except under explicit provisions of treaty or statute to that effect, either
declaring a certain tribe, or those members who chose to remain behind
on the removal of the tribe westward, to be citizens, or authorizing indi-
viduals of particular tribes to become citizens on application to a court of
the United States for naturalization and satisfactory proof of fitness for
civilized life.
Id. Congress overturned this ruling through the Citizenship Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a) (2), which granted United States citizenship to all Native Americans. See id. If
the Citizenship Act is revoked, under Elk v. Wilkins Native Americans would no longer
be citizens of the United States because of the Tribal citizenship. See Robert B. Porter,
The Demise of Ongewehowen and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the
Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HAv.
BLACKLETTu L.J. 107, 175-82 (1999). Given the nature of Native American citizenship,
it is problematic to assume the Federal government is "Father of the Country" with re-
gard to Native Americans.
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In fact, most courts have accepted this as an absolute prohibition.9 4
However, other courts have held that an exception exists, allowing parens
patriae standing in suits filed against the Federal government when
"seeking to enforce the provisions" of a federal statute.' 9' Separate doc-
trines of parens patriae for States and Tribes should not exist. In
jurisdictions that apply this exception, Tribes should be able to litigate
under parens patriae to enforce federal statutes.96
CONCLUSION
Without Tribal parens patriae standing, American jurisprudence
leaves a gulf between protections provided for Native American citizens
and non-Native American citizens. Relying on the States to champion
the rights of individual Native American citizens is insufficient. Tribes
have long protected their members and wish to fulfill this role in the
modem legal context. This Note recommends that Federal and State
courts recognize parens patriae standing in Tribes without the "all mem-
bers" requirement, thus bringing parens patriae doctrine, as applied to
Tribes, in line with current Supreme Court holdings. The additional re-
quirement currently applied to Tribes, that litigation be on behalf of all
members, must be dropped in favor of the "substantial segment of [the]
population"' 197 requirement.
194. See, e.g., Nevada v. Burford, 918 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 945 (1994) ("Our earlier cases ... must, of course, give way to the Supreme Court's
clear statement in Snapp.") (internal citations omitted).
195. See, e.g., Kansas ex. rel. Hayden v. United States, 748 F. Supp. 797, 802 (D. Kan.
1990), dism'd on other grounds on reconsideration, 751 F. Supp. 1495 (D. Kan. 1990).
196. Although there is not an exact symmetry between the sovereign rights of States
and Tribes in American jurisprudence, there is no justification for creating a separate and
more restrictive doctrine of parens patriae for Tribes.
197. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
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